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Mr. Chairman, I am Ralph Hunsaker, I am an attorney with
O'Connor, Cavanagh, Anderson, Westover, Killingsworth & Beshears
of Phoenix, Arizona. I represent the Central Arizona Water
Conservation District; however, today I am also appearing on
behalf of the Department of Water Resources of Arizona, the
Colorado River. Board of California, and the Colorado River
Commission of Nevada. These three agencies have the responsibility to speak for their states on policy with regard to the
management and use of the Colorado-River. I am accompanied by
Alan Kleinman, Director of the Arizona Department of Water
Resources, Dennis Underwood, executive Director of the Colorado
River Board of California, and Jack Stonehocker, Director of the
Colorado River Commission of Nevada.

We appreciate the opportunity to testify before your
Committee on H.R. 2642.
The issue of Indian and other reserved water rights
continues to be one of the most troubling to deal with in areas of
the western United States where water is in short supply. The
Winters doctrine of Indian reserved water rights is a recognized
aspect of western water law, and the right of Indian tribes to
develop their reservation lands is unquestioned. However,
because Winters rights do not depend on past use of water, uncertainty as to the magnitude of Indian water rights claims and if
and when they will actually be exercised makes administration of
rights difficult and subjects long standing junior appropriators
to having their use of water cut back or terminated, disrupting
the economies they represent. This is an unavoidable consequence
of the Winters right generally.
However, in the past few years, the Department of the
Interior has made a significant change in course in dealing with
Winters rights which has worsened the uncertainty problem. It now
views them as a financial tool to accomplish Indian water rights
settlements rather than as an opportunity for land development
within reservation boundaries, which is the rationale the courts
have used in development of the doctrine. The Winters doctrine,
which has been developed entirely through court action, has never
been extended by a court to permit sale of the water apart from
the land. Traditionally, the Department, to meet Indian financial
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needs or to settle monetary claims of tribes, has requested
appropriations from Congress. It apparently now views sale of
these water rights outside of reservation boundaries as a money
making opportunity and a way to reduce federal budgetary needs.
Further discussion of the issue of whether Winters rights may
be sold for use off the reservation and apart from the land is
provided in an attachment to this statement.
The Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Final Settlement
Agreement of December 10, 1986 represents a complex and apparently
comprehensive resolution of Winters water rights for the Ute
Mountain Ute and Southern Ute Tribes on the stream systems
involved. Two important principles regarding off reservation use
within Colorado are a part of that settlement: (1)

the re-

quirement that Winters rights be subject to state administration of
water rights and (2)

subordination of the priority dates of each

Winters right to protect junior appropriators. We feel that these
two principles represent a significant advance for the
administration of Winters rights and believe they should be
considered in every settlement of this character.
Our concern with the settlement is found in Article V B(b) of
the Settlement Agreement. That language states:
"Solely as a compromise for the purposes of this settlement,
the parties agree that the Tribes may, under this Agreement, use
the project and non-project reserved water rights secured to the
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Tribes by this Agreement outside the boundaries of their
reservations:

b. outside the State to the extent permitted by any:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

State law;
Federal law;
interstate compact; or
international treaty

that pertains to the Colorado River or its tributaries, including
the appropriation, use, development, storage, regulation,
allocation, conservation, exportation or quality of those waters;
provided, however, that nothing in this Agreement shall be

construed to establish, address, or prejudice whether, or the
extent to which, any of the aforementioned laws do or do not
permit, govern or apply to the use of the Tribes' water outside
the State."
Management and use of Colorado River water is governed by a
series of interstate compacts, international treaties, United
States Supreme Court decrees, federal and state statutes and
contracts collectively described as "The Law of the River" which
apportions water rights between basins and among the seven
Colorado River Basin states and establishes a priority system to
the use of Colorado River water. These documents, painfully
developed over the past 65 years, have been relied upon institutionally by the seven Colorado River Basin states in the
development of their apportioned Colorado River water and, in the
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case of Mexico, its annual guaranteed delivery of river water
pursuant to the Mexican Water Treaty between the United States and
Mexico.
A basic premise of the river's priority of use system is that
water which cannot be beneficially used by a Colorado River right
holder becomes available to meet the water needs of lower priority
right users, which may not otherwise be met. By the same token,
unused apportionments of one state can be beneficially used by
another state until such time as those waters are needed by the
state to which the water was apportioned. Given that the river
has been fully apportioned and that the states' total
apportionments and the delivery obligations pursuant to the
Mexican Water Treaty far exceed the river's long-term supply, the
selling and leasing of a state's unused apportioned water for use
in another state by any entity is inconsistent with The Law of the
River and would severely injure other river users. It would
allow a party with no Colorado River water rights to obtain
priorities to and take Colorado River water away from entities
and states with long standing rights.
As an example of the importance of The Law of the River
apportionment and priority scheme one only needs to review the
testimony and reports leading up to the passage of Public Law
90-537, the Colorado River Basin Project Act, which among others
authorized the Animas - La Plata Project and the Central Arizona
Project. The feasibility of the Central Arizona Project was and
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is dependent upon receiving all water that is not needed in the
Upper Basin. If this water is sold, it would diminish the yield of
the Central Arizona Project. The Congress was keenly aware of
this in its authorization of the project.
The Indian reservations involved in the Settlement Agreement
are located in Colorado and transfer of their rights as set forth
in the agreement outside Colorado to another state within the
Colorado River system would be inconsistent with and therefore not
permitted by The Law of the River.
Attached to this statement is a more in depth review of The
Law of the River with regard to the Settlement Agreement. The key
provisions of The Law of the River on this issue are the Colorado
River Compact of 1922, the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, the
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact of 1948 and several Supreme
Court decisions and decrees in Arizona v. California. Running
through each of these is the basic theme of protecting the rights
and interests of the two basins and each of the states to the use
and priorities of their apportioned share of Colorado River water.
The apportionment and priority scheme is comprehensive in dealing
with the waters of the river, designates quantities and priorities
for use within each of the states, and identifies which state will
be . charged with the use involved.
The foundation document is the 1922 Colorado River Compact
which divided the water of the Colorado River System between the
Upper Division states of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming
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and the Lower Division states of Arizona, California, and Nevada.
The Compact apportions from the Colorado River System to each of
the two Basins "the exclusive beneficial comsumptive use to
7,500,000 acre-feet of water per annum". It requires the Upper
Division states to allow at least 75,000,000 acre-feet'of water to
arrive at Lee Ferry every ten years. It also provides:
"The States of the Upper Division shall not
withhold water, and the states of the Lower Division
shall not require the delivery of water, which
cannot reasonably be applied to domestic and agricultural uses." [Article III (e)].
The development of the Lower Basin and apportionment of its
7,500,000 acre-feet share under the Compact began with
Congressional passage of the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act. In
so doing, Congress explicitly approved the Compact and made the
rights of the United States to Colorado River System water, "as
well as the rights of those claiming under the United States,"
subject to the Compact. This presumably makes Indian reservations
claiming Colorado River System waters, such as the Ute Mountain
Ute and Southern Ute Tribes, subject to the Compact.
This Act, in addition to authorizing construction of Hoover
Dam and the All-American Canal, preempted state water rights
administration of the mainstream of the River within the Lower
Basin and made a contract with the Secretary mandatory for any
diversion of water.
-7-

The Supreme Court, in Arizona v. California, supra, 373 U.S.
546 (Opinion) 376 U.S. 340 (1964) (Decree), adopted the
apportionment scheme of the Boulder Canyon Project Act and also
recognized broad discretion in the Secretary of the Interior to
allocate and distribute waters from the mainstream of the Colorado
River available for consumptive use in the Lower Basin.
Unlike the Lower Division States, which had to rely on the
Supreme Court to finally apportion the Lower Basin share of
Colorado River Compact waters, the states with claims to the Upper
Basin share were able to agree on a division among them. The 1948
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact was signed by Arizona,
Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.
These documents and others making up The Law of the River bar
the interstate and interbasin transfer of the Winters water rights
of the Ute Indian reservations. They require that the user basin
or user state be charged with the use of the water under the water
accounting system they establish. They do not recognize or
establish any procedures whereby such transfers could be
accommodated or dealt with or the transferring state could be
charged with the water use. In addition, while priority dates are
set forth in the Settlement Agreement for use of these waters
within the State of Colorado, there is no process for evaluating
priorities across state lines and accommodating the impact on
those in other states.
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The sale of Winters water within the State of Colorado has
been considered in some detail in the Settlement Agreement.
Priority dates and administrative problems have been settled and
the rights of junior appropriators have been protected. The
opposite is true with regard to interbasin and interstate sales.
The disclaimer language in Article V of the Settlement Agreement
does not begin to answer these questions and essentially abandons
all of them once again to the courts, a result none of the states
wish to contemplate. The purpose of the Settlement Agreement was
to eliminate litigation.
We therefore believe that this provision is ill conceived
and will only serve to disrupt the entire structure of rights and
priorities to and use of Colorado River water developed and relied
upon over the past 65 years since the Compact was agreed upon. We
ask that the legislation be amended to prohibit interstate and
interbasin sales and to protect states and individuals not
signatory to the Settlement Agreement. We have attached proposed
amendments to Sections 4, 5 and 11 of H.R. 2642 to accomplish
these results.
As I have indicated, we are greatly concerned about the
actual impact and legal implications of Congressional
endorsement of the off-reservation use of Winters water rights.
The proponents of H.R. 2642 assert that section 5 of the bill is
designed solely to avoid the possible applicability of the general
restrictions against alienation of Indian land in the Indian
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Non-Intercourse Act (25 U.S.C. 177). However, the broad
authorization of section 5 to transfer Winters water "in
accordance with Article V of the Agreement" grants unqualified
Congressional "approval" of the off-reservation use which is our
principal concern. The present disclaimer language in subsection
5 (c) does not adequately negate the implications of such a
legislative "authorization". Consequently, we propose simply to
modify subsection 5 (a) to remove the possible impediment of the
Indian

Non-Intercourse

Act, which is the proponents' stated

objective. This direct approach leaves the validity of the offreservation use dependent on a source other than the statute,
while new subsection 5 (c) (2) expressly negates the Settlement
Agreement and the statute as the course of that authority, except
as to parties to the Settlement Agreement.
With respect to our second

concern, that

off-reservation use

might violate The Law of the River, we have proposed a two
pronged defense to that possibility. We believe that out-ofstate uses, which present the most serious problem for the
reasons I have already outlined, should be prohibited and would
add a new subsection 5 (b) (3) to so provide. This should be
acceptable to the Tribes, since their representatives advise us
that they have no plans for any such transactions.
For in-state uses, we propose in a new subsection 5 (b) (4)
that the Secretary be required to give notice and an opportunity
to comment on such a proposal in order to permit public evaluation
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of a specific proposed transaction to determine whether it
conflicts with The Law of the River. This is a fair procedure and
should not impose any undue burden on the Tribes.
We propose to amend section 5 (c) to conform to our proposed
amendment of subsection 5 (a), i.e., that this Act would not
constitute a statutory authorization for off-reservation use.
Subsection 5 (c) (1) would be amended to make it clear that the
bill is not intended to amend The Law of the River. Since the
Boulder Canyon Project Act, the Colorado River Storage Project Act
and the Colorado River Basin Project Act are all supplemental to
the "reclamation laws" which are "waived" by Section 4 (b), the
latter section is also made subject to the disclaimer language in
section 5 (c) (1).
The legal attributes of any existing federal implied water
rights that may attach to the Tribes' reservations can only be
determined by the courts. Consequently, new subsection 5 (c) (2)
of our amendment makes it clear that the legislation and the
Settlement Agreement (1) do not validate any claim by the Tribes
of their legal right to make off-reservation uses under any
reserved water right which may attach to their reservations, (2)
shall not constitute a defense to any claim or injury by a party
who is not signatory to the Settlement Agreement and (3) shall
have no precedential value with respect to any other legislation
or litigation.
Because of the implications in Article V of the Settlement
Agreement which our proposed a mendments to H.R. 2642 are designed

to neutralize, we propose an amendment to section 11 of the bill to
reverse the specified rule of construction by providing that the
Settlement Agreement shall be construed in a manner consistent with
the Act, not vice-versa.
Mr. Chairman, the three Colorado River Basin states that I
speak for today have indicated that they may wish to submit
additional materials on this important piece of legislation. I,
therefore, request that the record be held open to allow for this.

Proposed Amendments to H.R. 2642
(Deletions struck through; additions underscored)
SEC. 4. PROJECT RESERVED WATERS.
(a) WATER FROM ANIMAS-LA PLATA AND DOLORES PROJECTS.-The Secretary is hereby authorized to use water from the
Animas-La Plata and Dolores Projects to supply the project
reserved water rights of the Tribes in accordance with the
Agreement.
(b) APPLICATION OF FEDERAL RECLAMATION LAWS.--With
respect to the project reserved water supplied to the Tribes
or their lessees from the Dolores and Animas-La Plata
projects And subiect to the limitations of subsection 5(c),
Federal reclamation la ys shall not apply to those project
reserved, waters except to the extent that those laws may also
apply to the other reserved waters of the Tribes. Federal
reclamation laws shall not be waived or modified by this
subsection insofar as those laws are required to effectuate
the terms and conditions contained in article III, section A,
subsection 1 and 2, and Article III, section B, subsection 1
of the Agreement.

*

*

*

SEC. 5. TRIBAL WATER USE CONTRACTS.
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(a) WAIVER OF INDIAN NON-INTERCOURSE ACT - No otherwise
valid contract entered i nto by either Tribe for the sale.
exchanae. lease or other temoorarv disposition of water to
which it may be entitled under existina law shall be subject
to the provisions of 25 U.S.C. 177: provided that (11 the
Tribes shall not permanently alienate any water rights or
enter into Tribal water use contracts which exceed 50 years
in duration. includina all renewals. and (2) such Tribal
water use contracts shall be subiect to aooroval by the
Secretary as provided by subsection (b) of this section.
(b) APPROVAL BY SECRETARY.-- (1) The Secretary shall
approve or disapprove any water use contract submitted to him
within 180 days after submission or within 60 days after any
required compliance with section 102(2)(C) of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C))
whichever is later. Any party to such a contract may enforce
the provisions of this subsection pursuant to section 1361 of
title 28, United States Code.

(2) In determining whether to approve or disapprove a water use contract, the Secretary shall determine if
it is in the best interests of the Tribe and, in this
process, the Secretary shall consider, among other things,
the potential economic return to the Tribe and the potential

environmental, social, and cultural effects on the Tribe.
The Secretary shall not be required under this paragraph to
prepare any study regarding potential economic return to the
Tribe, or potential environmental, social, or cultural
effects, of the implementation of a water use contract apart
from that which may be required under section 102(2)(C) of
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C.
4332(2)(C)).
(3) No Tribal water use contract shall be approved
or implemented for the use of that water outside the State of
Colorado pursuant to this statute or the Aareement.
(4) Whenever the Secretary is reauested to approve
a Tribal water use contract for off-reservation use of water
within the State of Colorado. he shall publish a notice of
such reauest in the Federal Register and afford interested
parties not less than 60 days within which to comment on such
proposal. The Secretary shall make written findinas in
support of his decision and Publish the text of his decision
in the Federal Register. which decision shall not become
effective until 60 days thereafter. The Secretary's decision
to approve or disapprove any Proposed contract shall be
sublect to iudicial review in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act.

el* (5) Where the Secretary has approved a water
use contract, the United States shall not thereafter be
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directly or indirectly liable for losses sustained by either
Tribe under such water use contract.
(c) 903PB -OP -AEPPHORBINPIeN. LIMITATIONS--(1) The

ettitherieetkert-previdect-fer-iit-sebentien provisions of
subsections (a) and (b1 shall not amend, construe, supersede,
or preempt any State law, Federal law or contracts, interstate compacts, United States Supreme Court decrees. or
international treaty that pertains exclusively to the
Colorado River or its tributaries, including the appropriation, use, development, storage, regulation, allocation,
conservation, exportation, or quality of those waters.
(21 Neither this statute nor the Agreement to
which it relates validate or are intended or shall be
construed to validate any claims with respect to the Tribes'
ability to make off-reservation use of water, nor shall this
gtatute or that Agreement constitute a defense to a claim by
any party not signatory to that Agreement. The provision of
the Agreement which permits the Tribes to enter into water
use contracts for the delivery of water outside the reservation and within the State of Colorado. pursuant to the
Agreement and subject to its restrictions with respect to
conformity to State administration of water rights. is made
explicitly for the purpose of settling the existing and
prospective lawsuits among the signatory parties. This
tribal opportunity shall have no precedential value in any

other legislation or litiaation.
(d) PER CAPITAL PAYMENTS. --The Proceeds from a water
use contract may not be used for per capita payments to
members of either Tribe.

*

*

*

SEC. 11. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
(a) IN GENERAL. - -This-het The Aareement shall be
construed in a manner consistent with the-hgreement this Act.
(b) INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF TRIBES.--Any entitlement to
reserved water of any individual member of either Tribe shall
be satisfied from the water secured to that member's Tribe.

ATTACHMENT TO
JOINT STATEMENT
OF
DEPARTMENT OF MATER RESOURCES
OF ARIZONA, COLORADO RIVER BOARD
OF CALIFORNIA, AND COLORADO
RIVER COMMISSION OF NEVADA
ON
HOUSE BILL 2642
REGARDING 'THE LAM
OF THE RIVER'
Septeiber 16, 1987
The current, proposed legislation seeks to implement the Colorado
Ute Indian Water Rights Final Settlement Agreement, dated
December 10, 1986. Article V(B)(b) of that Settlement Agreement
authorizes the Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute Indian Tribes to
use their water rights secured under said agreement not only
outside the boundaries of their reservations, but "outside the
State [of Colorado] to the extent permitted by any:
g(i)
"(ii)
"(iii)
"(iv)

State law;
Federal law;
interstate compact; or
International treaty

that pertains to the Colorado River or its tributaries. . . ."
(Settlement Agreement, p. 60.) However, the aforementioned
collection of laws (part of what is referred to as "The Law of
the River") do not permit out-of-state transfers to any extent
and therefore the language of the agreement creates a false
impression by implying that such transfers ma y be legally
permitted.
"The Law of the River" is that collection of interstate compacts,
international treaties, court decrees, federal and state
statutes, and contracts that control Colorado River operations
and the rights and priorities to Colorado River water. The Law
of the River is based on a scheme that apportions water rights
among states and between basins within the Colorado River
System, and a priority system to the use of Colorado River water.
A basic premise of the river's priority to use system is that
water which cannot be beneficially used by a Colorado River
right holder becomes available to meet the needs of lower
priority right users, which needs may not otherwise be met. By
the same token, unused apportionments of one state can be
beneficially used by another state until such time that those
waters are needed by the state for which the water was
apportioned.
The two Indian Tribes involved herein are located in Colorado,
1.

and any possible transfer of their rights outside Colorado to
another state or to another basin within the Colorado River
System would impact upon, be contrary to, and thus not be
permitted by the apportionment and priority scheme of The Law of
the River.
I. The Law of the River
a) The Colorado River Comnact
The foundation document is the 1922 Colorado River Compact by
which the seven western states in the Colorado River System
divided the waters in that system between two basins. The
Compact defines the Colorado River System as that portion of the
Colorado River and its tributaries within the United States
[Article II(a)]. It defines Upper and Lower Basins of the
Colorado River System according to where waters from those areas
drain into the Colorado River. Those parts of Arizona, Colorado,
New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming that naturally drain into the
Colorado above Lee Ferry are defined as the Upper Basin; those
parts of Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah that
drain into the Colorado below Lee Ferry are defined as the Lower
Basin [Article II(e)(f)(g)]. As is apparent, three of the seven
states--Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah--contain areas in both the
Upper and Lower Basins. However, Utah and New Mexico, along with
Colorado and Wyoming, are defined as Upper Division states while
Arizona, along with California and Nevada, are defined as Lower
Division states [Article II(c)(d)].
The Compact apportions from the Colorado River System to each of
the two Basins "the exclusive beneficial consumptive use of
7,500,000 acre-feet of water per annum [Article III(a)]. It
requires the Upper Division states to allow at least 75,000,000
acre-feet of water to arrive at Lee Ferry every ten years
[Article III(d)]. It also requires:
"The States of the Upper Division shall not withhold
water, and the states of the Lower Division shall not
require the delivery of water, which cannot reasonably
be applied to domestic and agricultural uses."
[Article III(e)].
The Compact also protects "present perfected rights" to Colorado
River System waters and provides that such rights in the Lower
Basin be satisfied out of the stored water once a storage
capacity of 5,000,000 acre-feet has been provided on the main
Colorado River within or for the benefit of the Lower Basin
[Article VIII],

2.

b) Lower Basin Allocations and Develoosent
The development of the Lower Basin and apportionment of its
7,500,000 acre-feet share under the Compact began with
Congressional passage of the 1928 Boulder Canyon Proiect Act
(BCPA). In so doing, Congress explicitly approved the Compact
[Sec. 13(a)] and made the rights of the United States to Colorado
River System water, "as well as the rights of those claiming
under the United States," subject to the Compact. [Sec. 13(b).]
Indian reservations, such as the Ute Mountain Ute and Southern
Ute Tribes, which claim Colorado River System waters under the
United States, are therefore subject to the Compact. Congress
not only made the Act subject to the terms of the Compact
[preamble] but also made the Act effective only upon one of two
contingencies: 1) ratification of the Compact by all seven
states; or 2) ratification by six of the seven states, including
California, plus California's enacting a law limiting its
consumptive use share of the Lower Basin apportionment to
4,400,000 acre-feet per year plus not more than one-half of any
surplus or unapportioned waters available to the Lower Basin
[Sec. 4(a)]. Congress also authorized the three Lower Division
states (Arizona, California, Nevada) to enter into an agreement
apportioning among them the Lower Basin share and providing for
use of tributary water [Sec. 4(a)]. Six states, including
California, did ratify the Compact, and California did pass the
California Limitation Act, thus making the BCPA effective.
However, the three states never agreed on an apportionment of the
Lower Basin's share, leaving it to the United States Supreme
Court, in Arizona v. California (1963) 373 U.S. 546, to rule that
Congress had indeed apportioned the Lower Basin share itself in
section 4(a) of the BCPA.
The BCPA promoted Lower Basin development by authorizing
construction of what came to be known as Hoover Dam and the AllAmerican Canal. In authorizing construction of the dam, Congress
was providing for storage capacity on the main Colorado River,
both within and for the benefit of the Lower Basin, far in excess
of the 5,000,000 acre-feet mentioned in Article VIII of the
Colorado River Compact. The BCPA again mentioned the need to
satisfy present perfected rights (sec. 6), but also gave the
Secretary of the Interior even broader authority to contract for
the delivery of water stored behind the dam to the whole variety
of claimants in the Lower Basin, not just to present perfected
rights holders. Congress made a contract with the Secretary
mandatory for any use of stored water: "No person shall have or
be entitled to have the use for any purpose of the water stored
as aforesaid except by contract made as herein stated."
(Sec. 5).
The Supreme Court, in Arizona v. California, supra, 373 U.S. 546
(Opinion) 376 U.S. 340 (1964) (Decree), adopted the apportionment
scheme of the BCPA and also recognized broad discretion in the
Secretary of the Interior to contract and distribute Colorado
3.

River System waters available for consumptive use in the Lower
Basin. In the 1964 Decree, the Court defined 'mainstream" as the
mainstream of the Colorado River downstream from Lee Ferry,
including reservoirs [Art. I(S)], and defined "waters controlled
by the United States" to include all waters in that "mainstream,"
including reservoirs [Art. I(E)]. The Court then enjoined the
United States (i.e., the Secretary of the Interior) from
releasing any "waters controlled by the United States" except in
accordance with a high priority accorded to the satisfaction of
present perfected rights without regard to state lines [Art.
II(A)(2-3)] and only in accord with the aforesaid apportionments
and 'only pursuant to valid contracts" between the Secretary and
any 'users" in Arizona, California, or Nevada [Art. II(B)(1-3,
5)].
It is thus apparent that any and all Colorado River mainstream
and reservoir water below Lee Ferry is controlled by the United
States and can only be allocated and distributed in the three
Lower Division states pursuant to contract. This is even true as
to present perfected rights, where an ongoing process seeks to
let contracts to holders of such rights recognized in the Court's
1979 Supplemental Decree (Arizona v. California (1979) 439 U.S.
419. But the vast majority of the three Lower Division states'
apportionments had been contracted for years earlier, even before
the Court's 1963 decision. In California, prioritized contracts
for 5,362,000 acre-feet of consumptive use were made in the early
1930's pursuant to the Seven Party Aareement entered into by
major California users in 1931. Similar contracts were entered
with Arizona and Nevada in the early 1940's. The Lower Basin's
full 7,500,000 share, and more, has been contracted for with
priority dates no later than the 1930's and 1940's, and the
Secretary must distribute mainstream water in accordance
therewith under the Court's mandate in the 1964 Decree in Arizona
v. California.
To reaffirm United States administration in accord with the "Law
of the River," Article III of the 1964 Decree explicitly enjoins
Arizona, California, and Nevada, as well as the major California
water user parties to the case, from interfering with "releases
and deliveries in conformity with Article II of this decree, of
water controlled by the United States;" [Art. III(B)) and
"From diverting or purporting to authorize the
• diversion of water from the mainstream the diversion of
which has not been authorized by the United States for
use in the respective states; and provided further that
no party named in this Article and no other user of
water in said states shall divert or purport to
authorize the diversion of water from the mainstream
the diversion of which has not been authorized by the
United States for its particular use;" (Art. III(C)]
"From consuming or purporting to authorize the
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consumptive use of water from the mainstream in
excessof the quantities permitted under Article II of
the decree." [Art. III(D)].
The 1964 Decree also provides that:
"Consumptive use of water diverted in one state for
consumptive use in another state shall be treated as if
diverted in the state for whose benefit it is
consumed." [Art. I(K)].
and enjoins the United States as to charging water use:
"Any mainstream water consumptively used within a state
shall be charged to its apportionment, regardless of
the purpose for which it was released;" [Art.
II(B)(4)].
Articles I(K) and II(B)(4) both mandate charging the
apportionment of the State in which water is consumptively used
for any water taken from the Colorado River system. These two
articles would apply to the five states which were parties to
Arizona v. California--Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico,
and Utah--as well as to the United States on behalf of Indian
reservations.
The 1964 Decree allows each Lower Division State the use of its
own Lower Basin tributaries [California has none] without
diminishing its share in the mainstream apportionment.
"Tributaries" are defined as all stream systems which naturally
drain into the mainstream below Lee Ferry [Art. I(F)] and the
United States is enjoined from reducing "the apportionment or
delivery of mainstream water to users within the States of
Arizona and Nevada by reason of any uses in such states from the
tributaries flowing therein;" [Art. II(C)].
c) Upper Basin Allocations and Development
Unlike the Lower Division States, which had to rely on the
Supreme Court to finally apportion the Lower Basin share of
Colorado River Compact waters, the five states with claims to the
Upper Basin share were able to agree on a division among them.
The 1948 Upver Colorado River Basin Comnact was signed by
Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.
Unlike the Lower Basin apportionment, the Upper Basin Compact
charges each state for use of its tributaries. It defines the
"Colorado River System" as that portion of the Colorado River and
its tributaries within the United States [Art. II(a)], the "Upper
Colorado River System" as that portion of the System above Lee
Ferry [Art. II(i)], and then apportions the Upper Basin's 1922
Compact share in the Upper System by awarding Arizona up to
50,000 acre-feet of consumptive use per annum and dividing what

is left between the other four signatory states on a percentage
basis [Art. III(a)(1,2)]. These apportionments are based on the
requirement that "Beneficial use is the basis, the measure and
the limit of the right to use;" [Art. III(b)(2)]. The Upper
Basin Compact establishes a multi-state Upper Colorado River
Commission to administer these apportionments as well as its
other provisions [Art. VIII].
Article IX(a) of the Upper Basin Compact provides, in part:
'No State shall deny the right of the United States of
America and . . . no State shall deny the right of
another signatory State, any person, or entity of any
signatory State to acquire rights to the use of water
. . . in one State . . . for the purpose of diverting,
conveying, storing or regulating water in an upper
signatory State for consumptive use in a lower
signatory State, when such use is within the
apportionment to such lower State made by this
Compact. . . •"

The Upper Basin Compact contains specific provisions similar to
Articles I(K) or II(B)(4) of the 1964 Decree in Arizona v.
California requiring the apportionment of the State in which
water is consumptively used to be charged for any such water
taken from the Colorado River System. First, it applies to water
use by the United States:
'The consumptive use of water by the United States of
America or any of its agencies, instrumentalities or
wards shall be charged as a use by the State in which
the use is made. .•"
. [Art. VII].
Second, it applies to use of water from five different Colorado
System rivers which flow in more than one State -- the La Plata,
Little Snake, Henry's Fork, Yampa, and San Juan:
"All consumptive use of water of [the river] and its
tributaries shall be charged under the apportionment of
Article III hereof to the state in which the use is
made. . . ." [Arts. X, XI, XII, XIII, and MI.
The Upper Basin Compact contains language concerning rights of
the United States:
"Nothing in this Compact shall be construed as:
•

•

•

"(C) Affecting any rights or power of the United
States of America, its agencies or instrumentalities,
in or to the waters of the Upper Colorado River
(Art. XIX (b)].
System. . .
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This language does not refer to Indian reservation rights or
Indian reservations are neither "agencies" nor
power.
"instrumentalities" of the United States. When reservations are
to be included, the term "wards" is used, as in Article VII,
infra . , where the language ". . . its agencies, instrumentalities,
or wards" (emphasis added) is used. Therefore, Indian
reservations rights can be affected by this Compact.
Once the 1948 Upper Basin Compact apportioned the Upper Basin's
1922 Colorado River Compact share, major development could
proceed. The result was the 1956 Colorado River Storaae Proiect
Act which authorized four major dam/reservoir storage projects in
the Upper Basin -- Flaming Gorge on the Green River, Curecanti on
the Gunnison, Navajo on the San Juan, and Glen Canyon on the
mainstream Colorado above Lee Ferry.
d) The Colorado River Basin Proiect Act
and the Overatina Criteria

Following the Arizona v. California decision fixing Arizona's
share of the Lower Basin apportionment, Congress passed the
Colorado River Basin Prolect Act in 1968. It authorized
construction of the Central Arizona Project along with several
Upper Basin projects. It also limited the apparent discretion
given the Secretary of the Interior by the 1964 Decree
[Art. II(B)(3)] to apportion water among Lower Basin users in
times of shortage, that is when less than 7,500,000 acre-feet of
mainstream water is available for consumptive use in the Lower
Basin. The 1968 Project Act provides that in time of such
shortage, the satisfaction of California's full Lower Basin
apportionment (4,400,000 acre-feet of consumptive use), plus
early priority uses in Arizona and Nevada, shall take priority
over any mainstream releases to the Central Arizona Project [Sec.
301(b)].
The 1968 Project Act also provides:
"Rights of the upper basin to the consumptive use of
water available to that basin from the Colorado River
system under the Colorado River Compact shall not be
reduced or prejudiced by any use of such water in the
lower basin." [Sec. 603(a)].
This section appears related to Articles I(K) and II(B)(4) of the
1964 Decree in Arizona v. Cakifornia and to the provisions in the
1948 Upper Colorado River Basin Compact under which consumptive
is charged against the apportionment of the state of use. Under
this section 603(a), the Upper Basin rights cannot be "reduced"
by any Lower Basin use of Colorado River System water. This
would apply to any attempt to transfer an Upper Basin right or
diversion for consumptive use in the Lower Basin and would
preclude diminishing the Upper Basin's 7,500,000 acre-feet share
7.

under the Compact by the amount of such consumptive use,
necessarily implying that the Basin (and State) of actual use is
the Basin (and State) to be charged.
.
Finally, the 1968 Project Act also requires the Secretary of the
Interior to develop operating criteria for the storage reservoirs
authorized by the Boulder Canyon Project Act (Lake Mead) and the
Colorado River Storage Project Act (Lake Powell and the Flaming
Gorge, Curecanti, and Navajo storage reservoirs) toward meeting
the 1944 Mexican Treaty obligation, the Upper Division States' 75
million acre-feet every ten years delivery obligation at Lee
Ferry, and other goals [Sec. 602(a)]. This requirement
reinforces the prior conclusion that the United States controls
and administers all mainstream %fetter below Lee Ferry in
accordance with the Law of the River and establishes that such
control also extends to the major Upper Basin storage reservoirs.
There is much, much more that could be discussed about the "Law
of the River," including reference to the Mexican Treaty of 1944
and the 1974 Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act, but the
previous discussion should provide sufficient basis for analyzing
the issues raised by the potential off-reservation transfer of
Indian reservation Winters rights.
II. Off-Reservation Transfers of Ute Mountain Ute
and Southern Ute Indian Reservation Water Riahts
For Use Outside of Colorado
a) Transfers For Use in the Lower Basin

The Colorado River Compact of 1922 allocates water between the
Upper and Lower Basins and controls interbasin transfers. It
reserves to each basin, "respectively, the exclusive beneficial
consumptive use of 7,500,000 acre-feet of water per annum"
(emphasis added) (Article III(a)), and thus bars the transfer of
an Upper Basin right, such as that of one of the Ute Tribes, to
any user in the Lower Basin.
The key words in Article III(a) are "exclusive . . . consumptive
use." Even were "use" not qualified, how could it possibly refer
to the transfer of a portion of the Upper Basin entitlement to
an entity in the Lower Basin whereby that entitlement is
consumptively used in the Lower Basin? The Upper Basin is only
entitled to water it can use, but how can it be deemed to have
used water that is consumptively used elsewhere? The words
"exclusive" and "consumptive" only reinforce this conclusion.
The Upper Basin's right is tO "consumptive use" of the water and
this use must be "exclusive." Not only must the water be
consumptively used by the Upper Basin, but that use must be
exclusive, thus precluding any consumptive use in the Lower
Basin.
The water rights of the two Ute Indian Tribes are part of
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Colorado's share (under the 1948 Upper Colorado River Mein
Compact) of the Upper Basin entitlement (under the 1922 Colorado
River Compact). Any attempted interbasin transfer of tribal
water rights would thus violate the Colorado River Compact and be
prohibited by it. These tribal rights are subject to the Compact
by virtue of the Boulder Canyon Project Act, in which Congress
explicitly approved the Compact [sec. 13(a)] and provided that
the "rights of those claiming under the United States" were
subject to the Compact [sec. 13(b)].
Even if interbasin transfers were not prohibited outright by
Article III(a) of the 1922 Compact, the only types of transfers
that would be desirable and attempted would be illegal pursuant
to other provisions of the Law of the River. The central issue
is wh4ch basin's entitlement would be charged for the water
use.11 The transfer of a water right makes sense only if the
entitlement of the transferor (which may or may not be the
diverter) is charged, not that of the consumptive
user/transferee. And where the transfer is interbasin, it makes
sense only if the entitlement of the transferor basin is charged,
not that of the transferee basin. The idea is to transfer a
right that might otherwise go unused to a user who would not
otherwise be able to get water at all, easily, or with such a
high priority. But if the user's apportionment is charged, that
cannot work. In the presenticase, if the user/transferee is an
entity in the Lower Basin, where the 1922 Compact entitlement is
already apportioned between three States and oversubscribed, the
user cannot both take water and charge that use against the Lower
Basin's entitlement without illegally displacing its higher
priority claimants. And if the user/transferee state's
apportionment of the Lower Basin entitlement were not
oversubscribed but instead still available for appropriation,
then there would be no need for a transfer from another Basin and
such a transfer would not be attempted. The point is that the
only interbasin transfers that would be advantageous, and thus
attempted, would be illegal.
This can best be analyzed by looking at the two methods by which
any off-reservation transfer of tribal water rights could be
effected. Either the reservation earmarks as its entitlement a
certain amount of water in the river system so that an entity in
another basin, state, or off-reservation in the same state can
divert and use that amount of water under a transferred claim of
right; or the reservation diverts water itself and physically
transfers it to an entity for use in another basin, state, or
off-reservation in the same State.
For interbasin transfers, the first method is doubtless the
cheaper, more desirable, and perhaps only practical way to
1. The same issue is central to the analysis of interstate
transfers, as we shall discuss, infra.
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proceed. But even assuming such earmarking could occur in the
Upper Basin, the Secretary can release such water for use in the
Lower Basin only, pursuant to 'valid contract and only, in accord
with the respective apportionments of Arizona, California, and
Nevada under the 1964 Decree [Arts. II(B)(1-3, 5)). Moreover,
these three states and other parties to the lawsuit, including
all major Colorado River water users in California, are
specifically enjoined from interfering with the Secretary's
operations and from diverting or purporting to authorize any
diversion of water outside the system of contracts with the
Secretary or in excess of the respective apportionments [Arts.
III (B,C,D)]. The Secretary has already long since entered
contracts with water users in the three states for the full
amounts of their respective apportionments. (Seven Party
Agreement contracts in California and the 1940's contracts with
Arizona and Nevada). Therefore, any proposed Lower Basin
user/transferee of an Upper Basin Indian reservation right could
enter into a contract, if at all, with a very low priority and
therefore a water entitlement only in years of extreme surplus.
The user/transferee would be no better off than if it had simply
attempted to contract directly with the Secretary without any
transfer of right, so the transfer would be of no advantage. Any
attempt by the user/transferee to divert water under the Indian
reservation early priority without contract would be illegal as
would be any action by the Secretary allowing a diversion without
contract or awarding a contract with a priority date ahead of
those already contracted for years earlier by other users in the
respective state.
Moreover, Article II (B)(4) of the 1964 Decree and section 603(a)
of the 1968 Colorado River Basin Project Act make it clear that
the apportionment of the State/Basin where the water is
consumptively used will be charged for such use, thus defeating
the whole purpose of the transfer, as discussed supra. Article
II (B)(4) requires the Secretary to charge the apportionment of
the State (Arizona, California, or Nevada) in which the
mainstream water is consumptively used. Section 603(a) applies
this same rule as to use in the Lower Basin rather than a
particular state. It provides that Upper Basin consumptive use
rights under the Colorado River Compact shall not be reduced by
any use of Colorado River system water in the Lower Basin, which
necessarily implies that any use in the Lower Basin must be
charged to the Lower Basin, not the Upper Basin. These two
requirements preclude any advantage in an interbasin transfer of
an Upper Basin Indian reservation water right. Such a transfer
is desirable only if the transferor State and Basin are charged
with the water use.
The second method to make such a transfer is for the Indian
reservation itself to divert the water and transport it directly,
physically to the user/transferee in the Lower Basin without the
water ever entering the mainstream below Lee Ferry and thus
coming under control of the Secretary. Such an alternative might
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avoid some legal Obstacles, but would encounter others, not to
mention the practical, financial problem of arranging an
alternative (to the river sysItem) means to transport the water
hundreds of miles to the use/transferee.
Article III(e) of the Colorado River Compact would prohibit such
transfer. It does not allow states of the Upper Division to
"withhold water" or States of the Lower Division to "require the
delivery of water, which cannot reasonably be applied to domestic
and agricultural uses." Just as with "use," discussed supra, the
common sense meaning of this requirement is that the Upper
Division cannot withhold water that cannot be put to reasonable
use by the states (or entities thereof) who withhold it. Putting
water to reasonable use does not mean diverting it and
transporting it hundreds of miles away from it to be used
somewhere else. If the initial diversion without consumption
constitutes the "use," what about the actual consumption? Surely
the water is "used" when it is actually consumed. So does that
mean it can be "used" twice as a legal proposition? Such a
reading of "reasonable use" simply makes no sense. The common
sense reading of Article III(e) prohibits an Upper Division
state diversion for interbasin transfer and consumptive use in
the Lower Basin.
Even if Article III(e) of the 1922 Compact did not bar this
second method of interbasin transfers from Upper Division States,
Article I(R) of the 1964 Decree in Arizona v. California defeats
the purpose of such transfers. It provides:
"Consumptive use of water diverted in one state for
consumptive use in another state shall be treated as if
diverted in the state for whose benefit it is
consumed."
This language is directly applicable to the situation at hand.
The state (and basin) of consumptive use would be charged for
said use, thus rendering the transfer pointless. It is clear
that the Decree intends that all Colorado River System waters
(excepting Lower Basin tributaries) reaching Lower Basin users be
subject to its provisions and that transferring Upper Colorado
River System waters around the mainstream cannot avoid the
Decree's provisions as long as that water is used by a party to,
or in a state that is party to, that Decree.
b) Transfers For Use in Another
State in the Ulmer Basin
Just as Article III(a) of the 1922 Colorado River Compact bars
interbasin transfers, so does Article III(b)(2) of the 1948
Upper Colorado River Compact bar interstate transfers within the
Upper Basin. Under Article III(b)(2), each state's
apportionment under the Upper Basin Compact is based on the
requirement that "(b)eneficial use is the basis, the measure, and
11.

• the limit of the right to use." This does not include the words
"exclusive" and "consumptive" as does Article III(a) of the 1922
Compact, but its meaning is qlear. It means that vis-a-vis other
states with Upper Basin apportionments, a state only has the
right to use that portion of its apportionment that it puts to
beneficial use. But what does beneficial use mean? Can "use"
possibly refer to the transfer of right to an entity in another
state whereby the water entitlement is consumptively used in
another state, especially when that state has its own
apportionment under the Upper Basin Compact? Any suggestion that
"beneficial use" can occur at some point other than the actual
point of beneficial consumptive use of the water is simply
manipulation of words. Of course, the term "beneficial use" can
be explicitly defined as, for example, in the California Water
Code section 1011 where conservation of water (i.e. nmuse) is
classified as a "beneficial use.' But when legislatures (or
interstate compacts) do not speak, and the Upper Basin Compact
does not in the present matter, "use" in "beneficial use" must be
given its common sense meaning which is to use, not to divert for
someone else's use, and not to transfer a right so that someone
else can divert and use. It is thus clear that any of the five
states with an apportionment under the Upper Colorado River Basin
Compact can exercise that right only to the extent that the
particular state beneficially uses that right.
If an Indian reservation in he Upper Basin attempts to divert
water for use in another Upper Basin state or transfer its water
right for exercise in another state, then that right has not been
put to beneficial use by the state in which the reservation is
located and cannot come within that state's apportionment under
the Upper Basin Compact. As such, the Indian reservation's
exercise of control over that water, by either diverting it or
transferring a right to use it, would put its state in violation
of the Compact vis-a-vis other Upper Basin states. To the extent
the Indian reservation right has been established and quantified,
as part of its state's allocation scheme, then exercise of that
right would be subject to that scheme so as not to violate the
Compact, and an interstate transfer would thus be prohibited.
Even had the Indian reservation Winters right been judicially
established independent of the state scheme, it is arguable that
the United States, in approving the Upper Basin Compact [63
Stats. 31] has bound the Indian reservations to its terms,
including the beneficial use requirement that would bar
interstate transfers and thus not extinguish the Winters right
but merely put limits on the extent (if any) of its
transferability. This conclusion is buttressed by comparing
Articles VII and XIX(b) of the Upper Basin Compact. As noted,
supra, Article XIX(b), exempting rights of the United States,
its agencies, and instrumentalities from the requirements of the
Compact does not apply to Indian reservations because of the
absence of the word "wards," which does appear, as in Article
VII, when reservations are to be included.
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Even if Article III(b)(2) of the Upper Basin Compact were not an
outright bar to interstate transfers within the Upper Basin,
other provisions of that Compact indicate that the state of the
transferor would not be charged for the water and thus render
illegal the only type of transfer that would be advantageous.
These other provisions do not authorize interstate transfers of
any rights, including those of Indian reservations, but do
indicate that in instances of multi-state involvement in the
exercise of a water right, the state to be charged is the state
in which the water is consumptively used.
Article IX(a) necessarily implies that a downstream state in the
Upper Basin, or any person or entity in the state, can acquire
rights to divert water in an upstream state for consumptive use
in said downstream state as long as that use is within the
downstream state's apportionment under the Upper Basin Compact.
However, this article appears to be limited to the situation in
which the diverter/right holder and ultimate user is the same
person or entity, but who, for engineering or other technical
reasons, needs to make its diversion in an upstream state rather
than in the state where the water is to be used. This is not the
same as a transfer of rights where the diverter/right holder and
ultimate user are two different persons or entities, as would be
the case involving one of the Ute Indian Reservations and some
user in another state.
Even under the situation contemplated by Article IX(a), the
language of that article requiring that the downstream use be
within that state's Compact requirement clearly implies that the
water use would be charged to the apportionment of the state of
consumptive use, not that state in which the transferor held the
right and/or diverted the water.
Several other Upper Basin Compact provisions contain the
requirements of charging the user state.
One applies to use by
the United States or its agencies, instrumentalities, or wards,
including Indian reservations [Article VII]; but such a provision
is necessary to clarify the need to charge any federal use
against the state in which it occurs and does not imply an
interstate transfer. Five other provisions apply to rivers which
flow through more than one state [Articles X-XIV]; and again,
these provisions are occasioned by the flow of a river in two
states and do not necessarily imply an interstate transfer of
water right. Finally, various provisions of Article V dealing
with water losses during reservoir storage provide that reservoir
losses of water stored for use in particular Upper Basin States
shall be assigned to those respective states.
What does seem apparent is Jest in every instance of multi-state
involvement in the exercise of a water right explicitly dealt
with by the Upper Basin Compact, the requirement to charge the
user state is imposed. Thus, even if interstate transfers of
Indian reservation water rights were permitted in theory, the
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only type of transfer that would be advantageous and thus
attempted--where water use is charged to the transferor, not the
transferee--would be illegals
Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, any interbasin or interstate
transfer of the water rights of the two Ute Indian Reservations
would be impermissible under The Law of the River.
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ATTACHMENT TO THE JOINT STATEMENT OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES OF ARIZONA,
COLORADO RIVER BOARD OF CALIFORNIA.
AND COLORADO RIVER COMMISSION OF NEVADA
ON HOUSE BILL NO. H.R. 2642 REGARDING
FEDERAL RESERVED INDIAN WATER RIGHTS DOCTRINE
September 16. 1987
An issue of great concern today is whether Indian
water rights. commonly referred to as Winters rights.1 / may
be sold for use off the reservation and apart from the land.
No case to our knowledge has so held. Moreover, a leading
commentator has noted that there are no general federal
statutes that authorize the sale or lease of Indian water
rights apart from the land. (Cohen. Federal Indian Law
Handbook. 1982.) An examination of the nature of the right, an
implied right at the time of the reservation and the basis of
the right, an adjunct to the land for the purpose of making the
reservation a productive area, dictates that Winters rights
should not be sold for use off and apart from the land.'
Indeed, to allow the sale of the right for off-reservation use
may well defeat the very purpose of the right, to add to the
productivity of the reservation.
This issue is of particular significance to the lower
Colorado River water users as the river has been apportioned by
interstate compact. Supreme Court decrees, federal legislation,
and federal contracts. Under that system, commonly referred to
as "The Law of the River." what one user does not use is

1. Pt is possible that some Indian tribes may have rights
which are not derived from Winters v. United States, but based
instead upon aboriginal or pueblo rights. (Tarlock, One River
Three Sovereigns: Indian and Interstate Water Rights (1987)
Land 6, Water L. Rev., Vol. XXII. No. 2, p. 647.) The nature,
extent and characteristics of such rights have not been
litigated.
2. Indeed, 25 U.S.C. S 177 may prohibit such a sale
without the approval of the United States. That section
provides in part:
"No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of
lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any
Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any
validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by
treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the
Constitution."

available to the next priority and what is unused in one state
may. under certain circumstances, be used in another state. To
the extent that reservations with Winters rights in the
Colorado River Basin may market their rights, the entire
federal scheme of water allocation will be undermined and there
will be a gallon-for-gallon reduction of long-standing rights
and contractual priorities. Those who have no rights, under
the existing federal priority system, will be able to purchase
the paramount priority and diminish the amount of water
available pursuant to contracts made over 50 years ago with the
Secretary of the Interior. As will be demonstrated, this
long-standing federal allocation of an interstate stream should
not be undermined by the sale of Winters rights. The very
nature and intent preclude any implication that Winters rights
should be sold for use off the reservation.
Winters rights were derived from the case of Winters
v. United States, (1908) 207 U.S. 564 (52 L.Ed. 340], which was
an action commenced by the United States to restrain
non-Indians from constructing or maintaining dams or reservoirs
or in any manner preventing the water of the Milk River. a
non-navigable river, from flowing to the Fort Belnap Indian
Reservation. The tribe had, by an 1888 agreement with the
United States, relinquished its lands in return for a
reservation for a permanent home. No water right was mentioned
in the agreement, however, without such a right the land would
be useless to the tribe. The Court found that it was the
policy of the government and the desire of the tribe to change
the tribe's habits and to become a pastoral and civilized
people. In order to accomplish these objectives and on a
smaller tract of land than they had previously occupied. the
Court found that there would have to be a change in the
physical condition of the land; i.e.. water would have to be
provided. Moreover. the Court followed the basic rule of
interpretation of agreements with Indians, that is, ambiguities
are to be resolved in favor of the Indians. The Court went on
to examine the circumstances surrounding the creation of the
reservation. Of apparent influence were the following: the
United States in 1889 had expressly reserved 1,000 miners
inches per year for domestic and irrigation uses and in 1898
the tribe itself had diverted another 10.000 miners inches per
year to be used for agriculture. More importantly, perhaps.
was the Court's view that the Indians had had command of all
the land and water, and had now relinquished that claim, to do
so without the promise, implied though it may be. of water
would have made no sense. Thus, the Court held that the United
States impliedly reserves water for the benefit of Indian
reservations when water is necessary to fulfill the purposes of
the reservation. In other words, intent is inferred if
previously unappropriated water is necessary to accomplish the
purposes for which the reservation was created.
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Three factors must be analyzed before a Winters right
may be implied: the reason for the establishment of the
reservation, the characteristic of the land of the reservation.
and the needs of the Indians on the reservation. In examining
these three factors, however, if the right is properly implied.
the right arises without regard to the equities that might
favor competing water uses. (Colville Confederated Tribes v.
Walton (9th Cir. 1985) 752 F.2d 397. 405, cert. den. 106 S.Ct.
1183 "Colville II".)2 , However. Winters rights are an
exception to the usual rule that the united States defer to
state law in the area of water rights. (See United States v.
New Mexico (1978) 438 U.S. 696, 715: 57 L.Ed.2d 1052.01
Thus, the purpose of the reservation, rather than an
actual application to beneficial use, determines the quantity
of water to which a reservation may be entitled. Arizona v.
California. (1963) 373 U.S. 546, is the landmark quantification
case. The Special Master determined that five Indian
reservations, along the lower Colorado River. should be awarded
water based on the number of practicably irrigable acres within
the reservation.ii The Special Master reasoned that the
initial purpose of creating the reservations was to enable the
tribe to develop a viable agricultural economy and that the
intention of the United States was to reserve • that amount
necessary to satisfy the expanding water needs of each
reservation. In speaking of the right, the Special Master .
wrote, "as pointed out above, the more sensible conclusion is
that the United States intended to reserve enough water to
irrigate all of the practicably irrigable lands on a
reservation and that the water rights thereby created would run
to defined lands, as is generally true of water rights".

3. There are two possible conceptual underpinnings for the
Winters rights, the tribe itself retained the right if it did
not expressly relinquish the right, or the United States
reserves the right when it created the reservations. In the
case of the lower Colorado River reservations. the Special
Master in Arizona v. California held that the UnitedStates had
reserved that right.
4. Because federal reserved rights are an
Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of
of such rights to that essential to accomplish
which the land is reserved. (United States v.
1984) 723 F.2d 1394, cert. den. 104 S.C. 3536:
at pp. 4. 6.
7.)

exception. the
the limitation
the purpose for
Adair (9th Cir.
see also infra

5. In Arizona v. California, the Special Master extended
Winters rights to reservations created by Executive Orders.
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(Report at 263.) Moreover, the Special Master later again
emphasized the connection of the Winters right and the land and
wrote. "(t]hey are of fixed magnitude and priority and are
appurtenant to defined lands." (Report'at 266.]1/
Practicably irrigable acreage is not the only standard which a
court.may use to award Winters rights, for the Court must look
to the purpose of the reservation. Thus in Colville
Confederated Tribes v. Walton (9th Cir. 1981) 647 F.2d 42
("Colville I") and Colville II the Court found a right to
water to maintain replacement fishing grounds, where the
natural habitat had been destroyed. It would appear that a
non-consumptive use, such as for fishing or hunting, cannot be
later turned into a consumptive use, and such rights may not be
transferred. (See United States v. Adair 723 F.2d 1394.)2/
Regardless of whether the purpose of a reservation was
agricultural or fishing. or some other purpose, the underlying
rationale of Winters rights is to make the reservation itself
more productive.
In determining the amount of water which is to be
available to the Tribes. the Supreme Court has shown a trend
toward practical limitations and a willingness to balance the
equities of competing water uses with those Tribes under
modern-day circumstances. Those cases have emphasized the
scarcity of water and the lack of foreseeably that the resource
would become scarce—I / Three cases of significance have been
decided regarding quantity. Two of them deal with
federsl-reserved rights in general and not Winters rights
specifically, but the courts have spoken approvingly of those
•
caseC1 discussing Winters rights.

6. The. Special Master did not reach the question of
whether the Tribes were entitled to change the use of the water
on the reservation. (Report at 265.) However, the parties by
a later 'stipulation agreed that the Tribes could use the water
for purposes other than irrigation.
7. Interestingly, the Court in Adair found that even
though the Tribe had transferred all their lands, that their
hunting and fishing rights and the Winters right necessary to
maintain hunting and fishing. survived.
B. These are obviously factors of importance of the case
in the lower Colorado River basin. To the extent that the
Tribes have been awarded water and.may be awarded additional
water in the 7 lower,Colorado River basin, that would mean a
gallon-for-gallon reductionfor certain public entities who
serve Colorado River water within the State of California.
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In Cappaert v. United States, (1976) 426 U.S. 126 (48
L.Ed.2d 523], the United States asserted a federal-reserved
water right for the Devil's Hole National Monument.~/ A pool
within Devil's Hole was the home of a rare species of pupfish.
By Presidential Proclamation, Devil's Hole had been withdrawn
from the public domain. The Cappaerts were pumping qroundwater
some 2-1/2 miles from Devil's Hole. but the pumping had caused
the level of the pool to decline. The reservation of Devil's
Hole. of course, preceded the state permitted pumping of the
Cappaerts. The Court held; "(t]he implied reservation of water
doctrine, however, reserves only that amount of water necessary
to fulfill the purpose of the reservation and no more".
(Cappaert at 141.) Here. the purpose of the reservation was to
preserve the pool for unusual features of scenic, scientific,
and educational interest; therefore, the Court held that the
amount of water which was reserved was only that amount which
was necessary to preserve the pool for scientific interest,
including a water level sufficient to serve as a natural
habitat for the pupfish. The Cappaerts were required to
curtail their pumping so that the reservation received its
minimal needs, i.e .. that which was adequate to implement th e
objectives of the reservation. Cappaert was followed by United
States v. New Mexico, (1978) 438 U.S. 696 (57 L.Ed. 2d 1052],
in which the United States asserted federal-reserved rights for
the Gila National forest from the Rio Mimbres River. The
United States sought water for among other purposes, the
preservation of the forest. aesthetic, recreational, and fi s h
preservation purposes. The Court recognized that in the
federal-reserved right claims, which are based upon an implied
right, that the courts had carefully examined the asserted
right and the specific purposes for which the right is reserved
and concluded that without water the purpose of the reservati on
would be defeated. However, the Court noted that prior cases
had repeatedly emphasized that the amount of water which is
reserved is that amount necessary to fulfill the purposes of
the reservation and no more. The Court in New Mexico reasoned
that where water is necessary to fulfill the very purpose of
the reservation. that it is reasonable to conclude even in the
case of express deference to state law. that the United States
intended to reserve necessary water. However, where water is

9. Some have cited Cappaert for the proposition that
Winters rights are also applicable to groundwater. Such a
citation is incorrect. since the Court in Cappaert specifically
referred to the pool as surface water. To the extent that
groundwater pumping affected the surface system, the Court
found that the United States could enjoin the groundwater
pumping.
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valuable for a secondary use. such as the in-stream uses which
the United States had sought, then the inference is that the
United States will acquire that water right in the same manner
as any other public or private appropriator. Thus. the Court
looked to the primary purpose of the reservation and determined
that the United States intended to reserve the water to
preserve the timber only.lO/ This case importantly
recognized that in instances of implied reserved water rights,
that it frequently requires a gallon-for-gallon reduction and
that this fact had not escaped Congress. and must. therefore,
be weighed in determining what if any water Congress reserved
for use in the national forest.
It was noted that the federal
reserved rights doctrine is built on implication and is an
exception to Congress' explicit deference to state water law in
other areas. The Court limited the right to the primary
purpose of the reservation.ll/
New Mexico was followed by the case of Washington v.
Fishing Vessel Assn. •s, (1979) 443 U.S. 658 [61 L.Ed. 2d 823].
Washington involved the interpretation of treaty fishing
rights. By treaty the tribe was allowed the right to take fish
at all its usual and accustomed grounds and stations in common
with all citizens of the territory. The issue in the case was
focused on whether the treaty gave the tribe only access to or
an actual portion of each run of fish.~/ The Court reasoned
that when the contract was negotiated that neither party

10. It could be suggested that courts should interpret
intent strictly to include only those uses that were clearly
contemplated in the land grant.
(Indian Claims to Groundwater:
"Reserved Rights or Beneficial Interest
33 Stanford Law
Review 103 (Nov. 1980).)
11

,

11. The primary purpose of a reservation is not limited to
one purpose only.
In U.S. v. Adair. 723 F.2d 1394, the Court
held that it was not required to identify a single essential
purpose, rather it found that fishing. gathering, and
agriculture were all primary purposes.
12.
In interpreting treaties, the Court reasoned that such
a treaty is essentially a contract between two nations and
unless the nations were at war and one is defeated, it is
reasonable to assume that the contract was negotiated at arm's
length. The Court found that standard applicable in this
case. The principle must, however. be coupled with the usual
deference accorded to Indians. These principles, taken
together, lead to the principle that it is Indians' likely
understanding which must prevail.
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realized nor intended that their contract would determine
whether and how a resource thought inexhaustible at that time
would be allocated between the Indians and incoming settlers
when it became scarce. Therein the Court held:
"As in Arizona v. California and its predecessor
cases, the central principle here must be that Indian
treaty rights to a natural resource that once was
thoroughly and exclusively exploited by the Indians
secures so much as, but no more than is necessary to
provide the Indians with a livelihood that is to say, a
moderate living."
(Id. at 685).
The Court set the maximum amount of fish which could be taken
by the tribe and left open the possibility that the tribe ' s
share could be reduced. For example, if the tribe dwindled t o
a few members or if the tribe found another source of support,
the right could be reduced, since the livelihood of the Tribes
under such reduced circumstances could not reasonably require a
large allotment of fish. The Court opened the door to all ow a
reduction but not an increase in the tribe's maximum
entitlement. By awarding a maximum, the Court satisfied a
certainty and finality standard, but also left room for some
flexibility for changing circumstances.
While those cases discussed above were not Winters
cases, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Adair, 723 F. 2d.
1394, cited with approval the Cappaert and New Mexic o cases an d
held that two guidelines had been established by those two
cases regarding Winters rights; water rights are implied on l y
where water is necessary to fulfill the very purpose of the
reservation and not for secondary uses; and the scope of th e
right is circumscribed by the necessity that calls for its
creation in other words, it reserves only that amount nec e ssary
to fulfill the purpose of the reservation and no more.
Thus, these cases recognized the exceptional nature of
federal-reserved rights and the need to limit such rights in
the face of today•s realities. Even though it appears to be
well-settled law that the tribe can lease and sell, under
limited circumstances, land and water together, that limited
right to sell does not support the right to sell such right
apart from the land.
In Skeem v. United States, (1921) 273
Fed. 93, land had been allotted to individual Indian tribal
members and subsequently leased to a non-Indian. The Court
found that the patents under which the individual tribal member
had received his allotment made no express indication as to
whether or not the water right would be lost if the land was
leased, therefore. the Court implied a right to lease a portion
of the water with the land although the Court did not directly
deal with the quantity or extent of the lessee's rights. The
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Court was of the view that treaties should be construed in
light of the purpose to induce the Tribes to relinquish their
nomadic ways, become farmers and that meaning should be given
to such agreements which would enable the Tribes to cultivate
all of the land so reserved.
In United States v. Hibner, (D. Ida. E.D. 1928) 27
F.2d 909. the Court relying upon Skeem. found that a non-Indian
purchaser of an allotment receives what was actually used by
the tribal member and what the non-Indian allottee can put to
use with reasonable diligence. The water is accorded the same
priority date as the other Indian water rights. The rationale
for allowing an Indian allottee to sell his land and the
associated water right was expressed by the Court in Colville
1. where the Court reasoned that because the use of the
reserved right was not limited to fulfilling the original
purpose of the reservation, Congress had the power to grant
reserved rights to individuals and to allow the transfer of
such rights to non-Indians; whether it did so is a question of
congressional intent. Since the Allotment Act was passed
before Winters. the Court held that Congress did not consider
transferability and, therefore, the Court must determine what
Congress would have intended. The Court adhered to the
principle that the diminution or termination of an Indian right
requires express legislation or a clear inference of Congress
of its intent to do so. Here, the Court was unable to find
such an intent for it was often the water right which gave the
land value. Therefore, the Court held that an allottee may
convey its ratable share of the reserved right and that the
non-Indian successor acquires a right to water which is being
appropriated by the allottee at the time title passes plus the
amount which the non-Indian successor puts to beneficial use
within a reasonable period of time. but no more than the Indian
allottee was entitled. Indeed. the Ninth Circuit has two
restrictions on the transfer of Winters rights, the non-Indian
right is limited by the number of irrigable acres owned. and if
the non-Indians fail to use the water. it is lost and cannot be
reacquired by the tribe. (United States v. Anderson (9th Cir.
1984) 736 F.2d 1358.) Thus, the rationale of these cases
wherein tribes or individual Indian allottees lease or sell a
Winters right do not support the sale of water apart from the
land.
Indeed, if they were separated, the land could be
valueless which would defeat the very purpose of Winters.
To allow the sale of Winters rights off the
reservation would be contrary to the very intent and purpose of
the right. Winters rights were created as an adjunct to land
and have no existence apart from the land.
("Considerations
and Conclusions Concerning The Transferability of Indian Water
Rights" 20 Natural Resources Law Journal 91. January 1980,
Jack D. Palma II.) Indeed, surplus water is beyond the scope
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of retained water rights for although the Tribes are entitled
to water rights, they are entitled to only the minimum amount
necessary to satisfy the purposes for which the reservation was
created. Moreover. Winters is an exception to the rule that
the United States defers to state law in the acquisition of
water rights and the intent to reserve such rights is implied.
Can it really be said that at the time of the creation of the
reservations that the United States or the Tribes contemplated
that water would be sold for use off the reservation? It is
clear that at the time of creation. the parties were seeking to
change the way of life of the Tribes by making them pastoral
and agricultural entities. To be sure, some of them also
retained fishing and hunting rights. but it is most unlikely
that the parties would have contemplated that the Tribes would
sell water as they sold crops. The intent was to make the
reservation, which was a reduced amount of land, productive
enough to allow the Tribes no less than the same standard of
living as that which they enjoined on their larger
reservation. They were not intended to benefit third parties
unrelated to the reservation, which would be the case if o ther
non-Indian users were allowed to purchase the tribe's water
rights for use off the reservation.
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